By: Margaret M. Cassidy & Andrew Swick
The midterm elections have shifted much of the power in Washington from the executive branch to a Congress where Democrats control both chambers by significant margins.
That shift will have a significant impact on U.S. defense and foreign policy, as the parties have differing perspectives on how the United States manages national security and engages globally; with Republicans traditionally being more willing to fund defense. That seems to suggest the trajectory the Department of Defense has been on — a historic budget, investing in and funding companies in the defense industrial base; faster and more commercially-oriented acquisition from U.S. defense contractors; limits on foreign investment in U.S. companies; and extracting foreign suppliers from the supply chain —could change.
However, examining how the current Congress views current national security risks, in the draft FY27 NDAA and recent NDAAs, suggests otherwise. As we noted in our recent article in War on the Rocks, both parties were united in the FY26 NDAA on the national security risks China and Russia pose, on maintaining relationships with allies, and on building a more agile, resilient defense industrial base.
Even though the center of gravity in defense and foreign policy will shift decisively from executive action to congressional oversight, Congress has already done the work in building the scaffolding: reporting mandates, funding fences, industrial base reviews, foreign investment scrutiny, and technology oversight. The new Democratic led Congress inherits authorities built by a Republican-controlled Congress with significant bipartisan effort.
Congress will certainly pursue investigations and oversight of executive agencies, defense contractors and those who invest in defense contractors. But expect the new Congress to support a defense sector facing serious strategic threats while trying to rehabilitate an anemic defense industrial base and capital-starved technology innovators.
The Defense Budget Will Largely Hold
Despite campaign rhetoric, and beyond the cuts to the DoD budget that members of both chambers have already signaled, the evidence suggests a Democratic Congress will not slash defense much further — except potentially to limit the Iran war and future troop movements. First, some of the most influential center-left national security voices, including Sens. Mark Kelly and Elissa Slotkin have been arguing for more investment in defense production capacity, munitions, shipbuilding, and defense innovation. Second, virtually every major defense think tank — conservative or liberal — and even some universities warn that the defense industrial base lacks the capacity to sustain a prolonged conflict, needs to rebuild manufacturing capacity, and must foster innovation at scale (see more at CSIS’s Center for the Industrial Base; CNAS, Sharper: Revitalizing the Defense Industrial Base; Brookings, Building Greater Resilience and Capacity in the U.S. National Security Industrial Base; and the Northeastern University Defense Industrial Base Institute).
Why? Because both sides of the aisle, along with industry and policy experts, appreciate that the Iran war has depleted munitions stockpiles which will need restocking even if the war ends tomorrow; that China is committed to building its defense capabilities, including its nuclear capabilities; that Russia is stomping around the backyards of eastern NATO nations; and that Congress has made clear U.S. commitments to NATO and AUKUS that are not negotiable — AUKUS alone already requires the defense dollars.
Research and Development to Production
Some of the questions related to the defense industrial base that both Democrats and Republicans have been asking, and will keep asking in the new Congress, are these: does the United States have the technology it needs, and can it build to scale?
Many of the loudest voices calling for AI adoption, software acquisition reform, autonomous systems, advanced manufacturing, and industrial policy are not defense hawks in the traditional sense. They are policymakers increasingly convinced that America cannot compete with China while using outdated acquisition processes, constrained production, or too little capital.
In the new Congress, companies will have opportunities if they can demonstrate:
- Production capacity
- Supply chain resilience
- Trusted capital
- Manufacturing capability
- Software deployment at scale
- Operational impact
- Innovative critical, dual-use technology
Both parties know national security demands a capable workforce and the facilities to manufacture, so look for the FY27 NDAA and the new Congress to create opportunities for:
- Munitions producers
- Shipbuilding suppliers
- Semiconductor manufacturers
- Critical minerals companies
- Autonomous systems firms
- AI providers
- Defense software companies
- Advanced manufacturing platforms
Defense Across Borders
The new Congress’ approach to export controls is unlikely to change, and scrutiny of both industry and the administration will be intense. Three things will keep export control policy on its current course.
First, export controls on both defense items and dual-use technology rest on existing laws that Congress drafted years ago and has refined – over the years, primarily, the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Control Reform Act of 2018Second, Democrats and Republicans both see China as a threat to steal U.S. intellectual property and the materials it needs to feed its hunger for AI and quantum. The new Congress will remain protective of U.S. critical technology controlled by export regulations.
Third, both parties are committed to controlling critical U.S. technology and to sharing it with friendly nations. That may lead Congress to expand the list of critical technology requiring control and to dictate how those controls are implemented — all the more likely given a weakened executive branch, and one viewed as letting critical technology out of the United States and into China’s hands. Congress may also limit the budgets of State and Commerce, or be more directive in appropriations to those agencies, to exert influence over export control policy and blunt the flurry of executive orders that relaxed some controls.
Going hand in hand with export controls are U.S. relationships with friendly nations. The new Congress will look to continue those relationships to shore up a global defense structure through more R&D collaboration, more foreign military sales, and more technology transfers to blunt Russia, maintain NATO, and respond to China.
U.S. Investors, Including DoD Itself
For years, Congress, the defense industrial base, financial firms, investors, and DoD itself have argued that the answer to a flailing defense industrial base, and to innovation that cannot scale for lack of capital, is the private market. That theory has evolved into DoD initiatives designed to do exactly that.
Look for the new Congress to continue supporting these efforts, especially the Office of Strategic Capital, which was first conceived and implemented under the Biden administration with strong Democratic support.
On deck for Congress in the current drafts of the FY27 NDAA are White House and DoD programs that let DoD take equity ownership in defense contractors. The new Congress will likely continue to support these initiatives, because contractors need liquidity and economic levers are needed shore up the defense industrial base which may also counter adversarial investment in it.
Under the Trump administration, DoD began several initiatives to invest in or fund defense contractors through executive orders and agency action.
For example, the White House issued Executive Order 14372 essentially barring DoD from contracting with defense contractors unless they agreed not to buy back stock, pay dividends, or make other capital distributions, and instead used the cash to increase production or manufacturing capability. The Senate is ready to codify that initiative into law, and it is unlikely the new Congress will oppose it. (Senate draft FY27 NDAA § 815.)
In April of this year, the Pentagon set up the Economic Defense Unit to use capital, trade, acquisition, and policy to support and expand U.S. economic strength and to counter adversaries through economic means. The draft Senate FY27 NDAA codifies the EDU into law and restricts its funding until Congress is briefed on its operations — including any DoD equity investments in private business — and until DoD certifies that it holds no board seats or voting control in any entity in which it holds equity. It also requires disclosure of conflicts of interest, among other things. (FY27 NDAA §§ 901, 1055.)
As for the Office of Strategic Capital, the new Congress is unlikely to walk it back. OSC was a Biden-era invention under then-Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, and it has survived into the current administration. Congress will likely look to let OSC take equity stakes in companies so long as it ensures there is no foreign ownership. The current Senate draft extends OSC’s existence for ten years and continues to allow loans and loan guarantees supporting private investment in critical dual-use technologies. (FY27 NDAA § 902.)
However, all these programs will likely be subject to congressional oversight and investigations. Private equity, venture capital, and financial firms should take note: historically, Democrats have been keen to regulate and investigate these businesses, and now that they are in power, they will flex their muscles with investigations, including testimony from the people who run them.
A Democratic Congress will look to demonstrate it is tough on Chinese meddling in the U.S. defense industrial base while calling out abusive corporate power in the same hearings.
Foreign Investment
Congress’ national security consensus around the risks China poses to the defense industrial base, and around its determination to acquire or access U.S. critical technology, is deeply bipartisan. Given that, a Democrat-controlled Congress is unlikely to deregulate controls that a Republican-led Congress enacted, that the White House ordered, or that the Pentagon implemented.
Instead, expect regulations limiting foreign investment in critical technology companies, infrastructure, and companies with access to the data of U.S. persons to expand — and expect more onerous requirements to extract Chinese military companies from the supply chain.
In previous NDAAs, Congress directed DoD to institute regulations countering foreign investment, control, or influence in defense companies, and the presence of Chinese military companies in the defense supply chain. Both the House and Senate FY27 drafts stay the course on limiting foreign ownership, control, or influence of defense companies, and there is no indication the new Congress will back off.
Current drafts of the FY27 NDAA direct DoD to establish an Office to Counter Foreign-Adversary Investment Risk, which will monitor ownership of defense contractors, give contractors information on risks related to foreign adversaries, and identify when adversaries hold ownership or control in a defense supplier. (House FY27 NDAA § 1816; Senate FY27 NDAA § 842.) With the Nvidia matter unfolding and Democrats eager to investigate it and other improper foreign influence, walking back plans to limit foreign investment in the United States would be inconsistent.
The defense industrial base has been waiting for DoD to issue regulations implementing a law passed in previous NDAAs requiring certain defense contractors to disclose and mitigate foreign influence. The Senate is expanding those requirements to reach more contractors, and it appears that initiative will not be affected by the change in Congress. (FY27 NDAA § 820.)
Given all of this, expect aggressive enforcement from the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, a Treasury-led committee, from the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security, the State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, and the Department of Justice around foreign meddling in U.S. military and dual-us technology. New committee leadership will press Treasury, Commerce, State, and DoD to police foreign investment, control, and influence over defense contractors and the supply chain, and to report to Congress on foreign activity and the agencies’ efforts to manage it. Contractors and others in the defense industrial base may be summoned to Congress to explain foreign business relationships, investments, and technology sharing or exports — especially defense contractors, along with businesses working in AI, semiconductor technology, quantum, space, and critical minerals.
As with U.S. investment, expect investigations and hearings into the structure of private equity and venture capital as Congress looks for organizational structures designed to obscure Chinese involvement, particularly where DoD failed to peel back the onion and identify Chinese control.
The new Congress will likely continue to welcome foreign investment from trusted allies and partners.
Congressional Oversight of DoD and Defense Contractors
The biggest immediate risk posed by the new Congress to defense contractors will be investigations of DoD and defense contractors, including those who invest in contractors and their supply chains.
Committees will use their power to subpoena testimony and documents, then hold hearings with all the drama of a media feeding frenzy, as Democrats look for testimony that can drive a headline, support limiting funding, ferret out criminal activity, or support impeachment.
Contractor executives and investors, including private equity and venture firms, will be hauled before Congress to explain:
- Their defense contracts;
- Foreign ownership, control, or influence; and
- Relationships with those in the administration.
How to Plan
For defense contractors, those in the defense supply chain, private equity, venture capital, and other investors, the question with this Congress will not be whether you get funded. It will be whether you can explain every dollar you received, how you spent it, who owns, controls or influences your operations.
Here is what to do now:
Be able to explain your funding. Be ready to explain sole-source contracts, why a program is behind schedule, how non-FAR-based contracts like OTAs came about, and who you know at DoD or in the administration. Gather the records now, for example, the basis for the award, your capabilities, the reasons for any slip in the delivery schedule, and your policies and training on selling to DoD legally and ethically before a congressional committee letter forces you to search for them under a tight deadline.
Be ready to lawyer up. If you do a lot of defense work and you do not have a lawyer who knows your business and can defend it, it is time to find one. Contractors are going to be questioned about whether they did anything wrong, what their communications with DoD consistent of, who their investors are and more. Having a lawyer who knows your business, who can advise you before you get subpoenaed and one who can defend you if you do may save your nerves and some dollars. Work with your attorney on a plan for preserving documents and communications, on a communications plan if you do get subpoenaed and to review your company’s operations around contracting and exporting. Be able to explain your export decisions. If the administration relaxed export requirements for your business, be ready to explain how that came about: who you met with, what emails were exchanged, and the rationale for relaxing export control regulations. Going forward, remember that export control regulations implement a law Congress wrote. Do not build export compliance on waivers from an administration that may not survive.
Map your foreign ownership, control, and influence. Expect CFIUS, BIS, DDTC, and Defense Counterintelligence Security Agency (DCSA) enforcement to get more aggressive and expect disclosure-and-mitigation requirements to reach more contractors. Know your customers but also know who is on your cap table, who your limited partners are, and who your beneficial owners are. Do a deep dive on investors looking for a piece of your business and document the due diligence.
Dive deep into your supply chain. Extracting Chinese military companies from the defense supply chain is bipartisan demand, and it is getting harder, not easier. Know who is in your supply chain, document your bill of materials, flow diligence down to subcontractors, and be ready to explain your work to both DoD and Congress.
Know the strings attached to capital. The equity and funding programs — OSC, the Economic Defense Unit, DoD equity stakes — are likely to survive, but with significant disclosure and reporting requirements. If DoD money touches your cap table, understand the conditions: buyback and dividend limits, conflict-of-interest disclosures, and foreign-ownership assurances.
Build buffer into your deal timelines. Deals are going to take longer even if there are no DoD dollars behind them, because regulations in development and those that will come out of this Congress demand more diligence, more disclosure, and more tracking of foreign ownership, control, and influence. Plan on longer deal timelines, and on possible congressional inquiries if you fail to disclose a deal to CFIUS or take foreign investment as a defense contractor.
Position for production at scale. If you have the capability to scale and only need capital to execute, the dollars are likely still there especially in munitions, shipbuilding, semiconductors, critical minerals, autonomy, AI, and advanced manufacturing. Understand the funding available and its requirements, then submit your application. But build a compliance structure to meet those requirements or be ready to explain to Congress why you did not.
The irony of a Democratic Congress may be this: it will commit to building and sustaining a capable defense industrial base designed to answer the China threat, to hold Russia at bay, and to maintain historical U.S. commitments and collaboration with NATO and friendly nations — and it will do so under the glare of a Congress demanding investigations and reports from DoD, with a significant number of Republicans on board given the shellacking the party took.










